ISIS's Doing, Putin's Failure

An early analysis of the March 22 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow, including comparisons to previous terrorism in and outside Russia

A terrorist attack on a concert hall in Moscow on March 22 killed at least 133 and injured over 140 more. With Russia making war on its neighbor for over two years, some early speculation went to Ukraine—though they’ve never massacred civilians like this—but it appears to be ISIS.

ISIS claimed responsibility, and it’s rare for terrorists to claim attacks they didn’t do. Lying risks credibility, in particular among sympathizers and potential recruits, and gives the real perpetrators an opportunity to embarrass them.

The United States says the Moscow attack was by ISIS-K, a branch of the Islamic State based in Afghanistan. If anyone suspects that’s an after-the-fact manipulation, the U.S. embassy in Russia issued warnings two weeks ago to avoid large gatherings in Moscow because of intelligence that terrorists planned to strike. And this attack fits ISIS’s style.

But Russia might try to blame Ukraine anyway, and use the terrorism as an excuse for crackdowns at home and aggression abroad that were already underway. In his first public comments after the attack, Russian leader Vladimir Putin did not assign blame directly, and did not mention America’s assessment nor ISIS’s claim, but did say Russia arrested four suspects and that someone in Ukraine had tried to help them escape across the border.

Ukraine strongly denied any involvement, Putin offered no evidence, there’s never been a known Islamic State affiliate in Ukraine, nor any ISIS-Ukraine connection. As a predominantly Christian country with a Jewish president that partners with the European Union and United States, Ukraine fits on ISIS’s long list of enemies, not its slight list of potential allies. Nevertheless, trying to cross into Ukraine wouldn’t be the worst plan for people trying to flee Russia from Moscow, and with public information lacking, the possibility can’t be ruled out, even if Ukraine’s government, military, and intelligence services had nothing to do with it.

But it wouldn’t be the first time Putin used a terrorist attack in Russia as an excuse for violence abroad, and he doesn’t need truthful accusations to do it. In 1999, explosions at apartment buildings in three cities, including Moscow, killed 307. Russia blamed Chechen militants and launched the Second Chechen War, with intense bombardment of Grozny. Putin, who was prime minister at the time, led the crisis response, and made that part of his campaign for president, which he won less than six months later. Though never proven, reasonable suspicion remains that Russian security services were involved with the bombings, executing a “false flag” attack to create a reason to invade Chechnya, and perhaps to pave Putin’s path to power. 

The recent Moscow concert hall attack doesn’t look like that. In the history of terrorism inside Russia, it looks more like Chechen attacks on a theater in Moscow in 2002, and on a school in Beslan in 2004. But both of those were hostage situations, with most of the deaths coming as Russian security forces stormed the buildings.

The concert hall attack more closely resembles the November 2015 Paris attacks, where ISIS killed 131 and injured over 400. As with the Moscow attack, most of the deaths came from gunfire and explosions in a concert venue, though in Paris, the terrorists were wearing explosive belts, and the first reports out of Moscow do not mention suicide bombings. After the Paris attacks, French forces arrested dozens, uncovering ISIS operatives in France and Belgium, including some involved with deadly bombings in Brussels the next year. Russia hasn’t indicated if suspects it arrested are allegedly attackers, planners, or someone else—and not that they’re definitely lying, but I trust their word less than France’s—and the attack just happened, so Russia might arrest others soon.

However, it’s very unlikely that the Moscow concert attack was a false flag. Unlike in 1999, Putin has been the leader of Russia for years, casting himself as a strongman. While responding to the apartment bombings helped Putin showcase his ruthless competence, failing to stop the March 2024 attack makes him look weak, especially with elites in Moscow whose support he needs.

And while the 1999 attacks gave Russia an excuse to launch a war it probably wanted to already, the latest attack comes more than two years after the invasion of Ukraine. Russia has deliberately bombed Ukrainian civilian targets the whole time, and been frustrated by Ukrainian forces on the battlefield. The Kremlin might lie that Ukraine was behind the terrorist attack, and say some Russian military action is “retaliation,” but it’ll just be an excuse. They’ve been doing almost everything they can think of to Ukraine already.

If Russia continues denying it was the Islamic State, that won’t neutralize the threat. ISIS-K carried out the 2021 suicide bombing at Kabul airport that left 183 dead as the U.S. military was withdrawing from Afghanistan. They’ve subsequently fought the Taliban government in Afghanistan, conducted multiple attacks in Pakistan—including a bombing at a Peshawar mosque that killed 63 in March 2022—and in October 2022 killed 15 at a shrine in Iran. ISIS-K also claimed responsibility for a shooting this January at a church in Turkey that killed one, as well as rocket fire into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

This indicates that Afghanistan has once again become a base for transnational terrorists in the aftermath of America’s withdrawal, as many feared. But it’s somewhat different than before 9/11 and America’s 2001 invasion, because al Qaeda partnered with the Taliban, rather than fought them, and ISIS-K seems more focused on its region, while al Qaeda prioritized attacks in the West.

The United States and Europe are naturally more concerned about their citizens’ security than Russia’s, and they oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine, but they’re right to treat ISIS-K as a shared threat. The U.S. and its allies oppose terrorism in general, and ISIS growing in stature is against their national interests. That explains America’s unreserved condemnation of the Moscow attack and expression of “solidarity with the people of Russia,” as well as the intelligence warnings beforehand.

And in that way, this terrorism resembles another recent incident: the October 7 Hamas attacks in Israel. Egyptian intelligence picked up indications of a big attack from Gaza and told Israel in advance, but Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government dismissed multiple warnings.

In Russia’s case, the U.S. embassy issued a public warning on March 7, 2024, that “extremists have imminent plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, to include concerts.” On March 19, Putin publicly dismissed American warnings as “provocative statements” that “resemble outright blackmail” intended to “intimidate and destabilize our society.” Three days later, extremists attacked the concert hall in Moscow.

Israel’s intelligence failure was worse, since the Oct. 7 plot involved about 200 times as many people, and Egypt is an Israeli partner with a joint interest in opposing Hamas, while America is a Russian rival. But in both cases, a right-wing government, led by a figure that’s dominated the country’s politics this century, dismissed prudent warnings of imminent terrorism, in part because the national leader cared more about maintaining the image he’s cultivated at home, and asserting control of territory across his recognized international borders: Netanyahu in the West Bank, and Putin in Ukraine.

All the innocent civilians killed in terrorist attacks on their watch are dead regardless.